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INSIDER TRADING FLAW:
TOWARD A FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET
THEORY AND BEYOND
KENNETH R. DAVIS*
No federal law specifically makes insider trading unlawful. Current law is
based on section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the general antifraud
provision. The deception giving rise to a trading violation under section 10(b)
is a breach of fiduciary duty to the source of the information. This approach is
misguided because the source of the information is not injured by the trade.
Rather, the counterparty to the trade is injured, and, in a more general sense,
confidence in the securities markets suffers as a result of trading on material,
nonpublic information. Even worse, current law does not clearly prohibit the
use of inside information in circumstances that no sensible law would
condone. For example, suppose a thief steals corporate inside information and
trades on that information. It is unclear whether the thief has violated section
10(b). Similarly, if a corporate insider provides material, nonpublic
information to a friend and the friend trades on the information, it is unclear
whether either party has violated the law. This Article proposes replacing the
current regime with fraud-on-the-market theory based on the well-recognized
duty to publicly disclose inside information or abstain from trading. A breach
of that duty would be a fraud on the public and the counterparty, and would
therefore violate section 10(b). The Article goes on to analyze and critique
congressional bills that propose new insider trading legislation.

* Professor of Law and Ethics, Fordham University Graduate School of Business.
J.D., University of Toledo, School of Law, 1977; M.A., University of California, Long Beach,
1971; B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, 1969. Thanks to my wife, Jean,
whose wizardry as a law librarian makes crucial sources suddenly materialize.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the law of insider trading has perplexed the legal
community.1 Scholars have criticized the law for its lack of clarity and
over-complexity.2 Such criticisms are understandable. Insider trading
law is a dysfunctional hodge-podge of rules that make little intuitive
sense. The problem arises in part because no U.S. statute defines
insider trading. Rather, the United States Supreme Court, with
minimal congressional guidance, has seized on the general antifraud
provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 to construct an
incoherent legal regime. Section 10(b) of the Act makes it unlawful to
use “any manipulative or deceptive device” “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”4 The Supreme Court has used this
broad injunction as the starting point to fabricate a confusing brand of
insider trading law. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court’s
“common law” of insider trading disregards common sense.5
1. This Article refers to all circumstances under which a party trades on
material, nonpublic information as “insider trading.” This term includes what is
often referred to as “outsider trading.” See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the
Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
881, 884 (2010) (explaining that the term “outsider trading” is frequently used to
describe trading by a non-insider possessing material, nonpublic information).
2. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Manne’s Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of
Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945, 949 (1985) (calling federal insider trading law
“unconstitutionally vague”); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of
Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 379 (1999) (calling the misappropriation theory
of insider trading a “theoretical mess”); Thomas Swigert & Milo Marsden, Insider
Trading:
The Supreme Court Takes Another Look, DORSEY (Feb. 5, 2016),
https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/02/insider
-trading--supreme-court-takes-another-look (commenting that insider trading law is
“notoriously murky”). But see Peter J. Henning, What’s So Bad About Insider Trading
Law?, 70 BUS. LAW. 751, 775 (2015) (arguing that insider trading law, though
imperfect, “works fairly well as a legal doctrine”).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).
4. Id. § 78j(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange[:] . . . (b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement[,] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”).
5. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (adopting the
misappropriation theory of liability); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654–64 (1983)
(establishing the contours of tipper/tippee liability); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 231–35 (1980) (adopting the classical or traditional theory of liability and finding no
duty to disclose for a non-corporate insider who had no confidential information).
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The fundamental problem with current insider trading law is that
the Supreme Court has defined a “manipulative or deceptive device” as
a breach of a fiduciary duty or confidentiality to the source of the inside
information.6 A breach of such a duty, however, has little, if anything, to
do with what one would consider wrongful trading on material,
nonpublic information. The trade is a wrong that is distinct from the
breach of such a duty. Furthermore, the source of the inside
information suffered no loss resulting from a trade made with inside
information.
The person with inside information deceived the
counterparty who alone suffered financial injury.7 The law should
therefore focus on a breach of the duty, established in In re Cady, Roberts
& Co.,8 to disclose publicly the material information, thereby making it
available to everyone, including the counterparty to the trade.9
Another fault of insider trading law is that in a tipper/tippee
scenario, liability arises only when the original tipper derived a
benefit from the original tippee.10 This requirement, which the
Supreme Court adopted in Dirks v. SEC,11 is extraneous to the wrong
that insider trading law seeks to redress. When a tippee knowingly
trades on material, nonpublic information, liability should not
depend on whether the tipper received a benefit for the information.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s discussion of this requirement has
engendered a split among the circuit courts.12 The issue is whether
the requisite benefit to the tipper must be direct, such as a financial
or reputational benefit, or whether the benefit may be indirect—that
is, whether simply providing the inside information to a relative or
friend constitutes such a benefit.13 The United States Court of
6. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229–30. This Article uses the term “inside information”
to mean material, nonpublic information.
7. See infra Section II.B (explaining that the focus should not be on the method
used to obtain the information and that the harm done is not borne by the source or
owner of the information).
8. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
9. Id. at 911.
10. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (prohibiting the exploitation of inside information
when the insider derives a personal gain from the use of the information).
11. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
12. Compare United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding
that providing inside information to a relative or friend does not meet the personal
benefit requirement of Dirks), with United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th
Cir. 2015) (holding that providing the inside information to a relative or friend does
meet the personal benefit requirement of Dirks), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
13. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092. The Supreme Court limited the issue on appeal to
whether a tip to a relative or friend constitutes a benefit sufficient to meet the
requirement of Dirks. 136 S. Ct. at 899.

DAVIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/31/2016 8:12 PM

INSIDER TRADING FLAW

55

Appeals for the Second Circuit held in United States v. Newman14 that a
concrete benefit—either financial or reputational—is required,15
while the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Salman16 that the duty
prescribed in Dirks is met when the tipper passes the information to a
relative or friend.17 This schism between the Second and Ninth
Circuits has spawned inconsistency in the law that federal courts
apply in insider trading cases.18 Given this confusion, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), with mixed success, has urged
courts to apply the Salman standard.19 To resolve this issue, the
Supreme Court has granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
Salman case.20 Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules, insider
trading law will remain focused on the wrong issues.
One promising approach to resolving the contradictions of insider
trading law is to adopt a fraud-on-the-market theory. The application
of this theory would be based on the Cady, Roberts duty to publicly
disclose inside information. This approach would continue to use
section 10(b) as the operative provision. Though having the virtue of
conceptual clarity, this theory would reach only those cases where the
trade occurred in a market efficient at disseminating material
information. Because most insider trading cases involve securities
traded on efficient markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) or NASDAQ, this limitation would not pose a serious
impediment to establishing an effective law of insider trading.21

14. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
15. Id. at 452.
16. 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016). On
October 5, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the Salman case. Ben
Protess & Matthew Goldstein, What Is a ‘Personal Benefit’ from Insider Trading? Justices
Hear Arguments, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5., 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/
business/dealbook/supreme-court-insider-trading.html?_r=0.
17. Id. at 1093.
18. Compare United States v. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1354, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2015)
(rejecting the Newman court’s narrow interpretation of the Dirks benefit
requirement), with SEC v. Holley, No. 11-0205, 2015 WL 5554788, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept.
21, 2015) (adopting Newman’s interpretation of Dirks), and SEC v. McGinnis, No.
5:14-cv-6, 2015 WL 5643186, at *18 (D. Vt. Sept. 23, 2015) (citing with approval the
Newman court’s interpretation of Dirks).
19. See Elaine Greenberg & Kevin Askew, SEC Enforcement: 2015 in Review, and a
Look Ahead, 48 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 586 (Mar. 21, 2016) (outlining two cases in
which the SEC was unsuccessful in enforcement proceedings, but one case where it
prevailed in a civil case after criminal charges were dismissed in light of Newman).
20. Salman v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
21. Every case cited in this Article involved a trade on a well-recognized securities
market where information was efficiently disseminated to the public.
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Nevertheless, a complete solution to the problems of current insider
trading law should come from Congress.22 There has been progress.
Representative Lynch has proposed a bill to redefine unlawful insider
trading.23 Representative Himes has proposed a bill calling for
broader changes.24 Senators Reed and Menendez have proposed a
bill that would establish an even more expansive scope of liability
than the two House proposals.25
These recent judicial and legislative developments present a fresh
opportunity to reconsider the law of insider trading and to propose a
new and more coherent framework. Part I of this Article analyzes the
three existing theories of unlawful insider trading: the classical
theory, the misappropriation theory, and tipper/tippee liability. Part
I also contrasts the Newman and Salman decisions.
Part II exposes the flaws of the three theories discussed in Part I.
As noted, the primary flaw in the classical and misappropriation
theories is the focus on a breach of a fiduciary duty or confidentiality
to the source of the information rather than a breach of the duty of
disclosure owed to the counterparty to the trade. This Part also
discusses the anomalous pre-condition to tipper/tippee liability that
Dirks imposes; namely, that the tipper receives a benefit.
Part III explores how to improve insider trading law. First, this Part
examines the presumption of reliance created in Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States26 and concludes that the Affiliated Ute Citizens
presumption does not provide a satisfactory resolution. Next, this
Part proposes extending fraud-on-the-market theory to insider
trading cases. This extension of fraud-on-the-market theory would
refocus insider trading liability under section 10(b) to a breach of the

22. See Che Odom, Congress Should Define ‘Insider Trading’: Ex-SEC Official, 48 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 405 (Feb. 24, 2016) (arguing that “[a] statute is needed to
create some certainty in the law,” and suggesting that “‘[f]raud on the market’ could
be used as a baseline standard for such a statute”). The Supreme Court adopted fraudon-the-market theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The Court stated
that “[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the market price does so in reliance on the
integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in
market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations,
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.” Id. at 247. The
Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality of fraud-on-the-market theory in Halliburton Co.
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014). See infra Part III for a more
detailed discussion of fraud-on-the-market theory.
23. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015).
24. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).
25. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015).
26. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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Cady, Roberts duty of disclosure owed to the public and to the
counterparty to the trade. Though conceptually coherent, this
approach has the drawback of applying only to efficient markets.
This drawback is relatively minor because most insider trading
involves securities traded on such markets. Nevertheless, a new law is
needed to provide a more comprehensive framework that would
clarify and expand the boundaries of unlawful insider trading.
Part IV discusses and criticizes the three congressional proposals to
redefine unlawful insider trading.
This Part recommends
broadening the scope of conduct prohibited under the ReedMenendez proposal.
The Article concludes with a call to Congress to enact a muchneeded law that would establish a simple, comprehensive, and
sensible law of insider trading.
I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF INSIDER TRADING LAW

Three theories of liability establish the prohibitions on insider
trading law:
(1) the classical or traditional theory, (2)
misappropriation theory, and (3) tipper/tippee liability. This Part of
the Article discusses and analyzes these three theories.
A. The Classical Theory
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use of
“any manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.27 In Chiarella v. United States,28 a
landmark insider trading case, the Court interpreted the quoted
language of section 10(b) to forbid a breach of fiduciary duty,
rejecting the premise that section 10(b) imposes a general duty
against trading on inside information.29
Chiarella was a printer working for Pandick Press, which printed
documents announcing corporate takeover bids.30 Though the
names of the target companies did not appear on documents

27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
28. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
29. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231–32. The Court also relied on SEC Rule 10b-5. Id. at
225. That rule, which supplements section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person
to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or to “engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2015).
30. Id. at 224.
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provided to Chiarella, he was able to deduce the names.31 He traded
the stock of these companies, without disclosing the names of the
targets publicly, and he ultimately profited more than $30,000.32
The issue in Chiarella was whether section 10(b) imposes a general
prohibition against trading on material, nonpublic information.33
The Court responded that “liability is premised upon a duty to
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction.”34 The Court explained that “[a]pplication
of the duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate
insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder’s welfare
before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use
of material, nonpublic information.”35 The duty to disclose or abstain
from trading, as first expressed in Cady, Roberts, however, extended
only to those who have a fiduciary duty to corporate shareholders.36
Thus, the duty did not apply to everyone in possession of inside
information.37 The Court justified this holding by noting that section
10(b) does “not [forbid] every instance of financial unfairness”;38 it
prohibits only breaches of fiduciary duty. Chiarella had no fiduciary
duty to the target companies—the companies whose stock he
traded.39 He had a relationship only with the acquiring company
because Pandick Press worked for it.40 Because Chiarella traded the
stock of the target companies to which he owed no duty, he had not
violated section 10(b).41

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 226.
34. Id. at 230.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 232.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 232, 234–35 (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision,
but what it catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty to
disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information.”).
39. Id. at 232–33. Nor was Chiarella a corporate insider of the target companies.
Id. at 231.
40. Id. at 232–33.
41. Id. Justice Stevens noted that an alternative theory of liability was arguable;
namely, that Chiarella had violated a duty to Pandick Press, his employer. Id. at 238
(Stevens, J., concurring).
Because the government had not argued this
misappropriation theory, Justice Stevens concluded that the Court was correct in not
addressing that issue. Id. Justice Brennan argued that, in addition to the classical
theory, section 10(b) prohibited the misappropriation of insider information any
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B. Misappropriation Theory
The Chiarella Court left open the issue of whether the
misappropriation of confidential information, absent a fiduciary duty
to shareholders, constituted a violation of section 10(b).42 In United
States v. O’Hagan,43 the Court held that section 10(b) forbids such
misappropriation.44 Grand Met retained the law firm Dorsey &
Whitney to represent it in its planned tender offer to acquire
Pillsbury.45 Anticipating the tender offer, O’Hagan, a partner of
Dorsey & Whitney, bought Pillsbury shares and call options.46 When
Grand Met announced the tender offer, Pillsbury common stock
vaulted from thirty-nine dollars to sixty dollars per share, and
O’Hagan made a profit of more than $4.3 million.47
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan answered the question left open in
Chiarella, recognizing the misappropriation theory as a basis of
liability for insider trading.48 The Court explained that a person
engages in unlawful insider trading under section 10(b) by
misappropriating “confidential information for securities trading
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information.”49 Unlike the classical theory, which focuses on a
fiduciary duty that a corporate insider owes to a company, the
misappropriation theory premises liability on anyone who, entrusted
with confidential information, trades on such information.50 The
rationale for liability under the misappropriation theory is that by
time the source of the information expected the recipient to abstain from trading on
it. Id. at 238–39 (Brennan, J., concurring). He found, however, that the jury
instructions did not adequately charge misappropriation, and he therefore
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 239. Chief Justice Burger not only believed that
section 10(b) adopts the misappropriation theory of liability, but he also concluded
that the government did argue the case on that basis; he therefore dissented. Id. at
243–45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, whom Justice Marshall joined,
wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that section 10(b)’s prohibition against
engaging in “manipulative” schemes applies to anyone who, with knowledge that
material, nonpublic information has been kept confidential, trades on that
information. Id. at 252 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 236 (majority opinion) (“We need not decide whether this
[misappropriation] theory has merit for it was not submitted to the jury.”).
43. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
44. Id. at 647.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 648.
48. Id. at 665.
49. Id. at 652.
50. Id.
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trading on confidential information, a person has deceived the
source.51 Such trading therefore constitutes “a deceptive device or
contrivance,” which is forbidden under section 10(b).52
From a policy point of view, the Court observed that the
misappropriation theory promotes investor confidence.53 Average
investors would not be able to overcome the disadvantage they would
face when competing with those trading on misappropriated
information.54
Allowing the trading of securities based on
misappropriated information would therefore undermine investor
confidence and would discourage potential investors from
participating in capital markets.55
C. Tipper/Tippee Liability
Dirks v. SEC is the seminal case on insider trading involving a tipper
and a tippee. As shown below, the elements of tipper/tippee liability
remain controversial thirty years after the Dirks decision.
The Dirks case
Raymond Dirks was an officer of a broker-dealer that analyzed
insurance company securities and provided the analyses to
institutional investors.56 Equity Funding was a company that sold life
insurance and mutual fund shares to its customers.57 Ronald Secrist,
a former officer of Equity Funding, revealed to Dirks that Equity
Funding had fraudulently overstated its assets, and he urged Dirks to
disclose the fraud publicly.58 Dirks investigated Secrist’s charges and
found that certain employees of Equity Funding corroborated
Secrist’s allegations of fraud.59 Dirks discussed this information with
many of his clients, including five investment advisors who liquidated
more than $16 million of Equity Funding securities.60 Dirks also
revealed the fraud to William Blundell, a reporter for the Wall Street
Journal, but Blundell, who feared a libel suit, declined to print a story
1.

51. Id.
52. Id. at 653.
53. Id. at 658–59 (“Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities
markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where
trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.”).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 658.
56. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983).
57. Id. at 649.
58. Id. Neither Dirks nor his firm had a financial interest in Equity Funding. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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revealing Dirks’s allegations.61 In the meantime, Equity Funding
stock plunged from twenty-six dollars to fifteen dollars per share,
prompting the NYSE to halt trading of the stock.62 The State of
California then impounded Equity Funding’s records, finding
evidence of massive fraud.63 Soon thereafter, the SEC filed a
complaint against Equity Funding, and the Wall Street Journal
published an article based largely on information that Dirks had
provided.64 Equity Funding went into receivership immediately after
the SEC action and the news article.65
After an administrative law judge conducted a hearing into Dirks’s
involvement in the Equity Funding scandal, the SEC found that, by
disclosing material, nonpublic information about Equity Funding to
his clients, Dirks had aided and abetted violations of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act and section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933.66 The tippees, his clients, had committed primary violations of
the acts because they (1) knew or should have known the information
was confidential, (2) knew or should have known that the source of
the information was a corporate insider, and (3) traded on the
information.67 Because the tippees met these three elements, they
violated the Cady, Roberts duty to disclose the information publicly or
to abstain from trading on it.68 Despite finding that Dirks had aided
and abetted securities law violations, the SEC merely censured him
because he had helped reveal the fraud.69 Nevertheless, Dirks
appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed the SEC’s decision.70
The circuit court held that the recipients of nonpublic information
inherit the fiduciary duties of corporate executives who provided the
information.71 The U.S. Supreme Court granted Dirks’s petition for a
writ of certiorari.72

61. Id. at 649–50.
62. Id. at 650.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 650–51. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 also prohibits the
fraudulent sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012).
67. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650–51.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 651–52.
70. Id. at 652.
71. Id. (concluding that as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks also had
violated independent obligations to the SEC and the public).
72. Id.
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The majority decision

The Court began its analysis by reaffirming Chiarella, which held that
there is no general duty to disclose material, nonpublic information.73
A person, according to Chiarella, must have a fiduciary duty to the
company to trigger section 10(b) liability.74 Even given a fiduciary
duty, the very language of section 10(b) forbids only those breaches
that involve “manipulation or deception.”75 Such a “manipulation or
deception,” the Court believed, occurs when the insider trades on
material, nonpublic information and reaps “secret profits.”76
The Dirks Court recognized, however, that assigning liability to
tippees requires an analytic step that the Chiarella Court did not
make.77 The question was whether, as the circuit court had held, a
non-insider tippee automatically inherited the duty of an insider
tipper and, if not, what elements must be met for tippee liability to
arise.78 In resolving this issue, the Court rejected the SEC’s view that
tippees inherit the fiduciary obligations of corporate insiders.79 The
fallacy in the SEC’s reasoning, said the Court, stemmed from the
mistaken belief that sections 10(b) and 17(a) require equal
information to all market participants.80 The Court observed that
analysts, in the course of researching securities, often acquire
material, nonpublic information and that the acquisition of such
information is a necessary function of a vibrant securities market.81
To trigger liability, a corporate insider who acts as a tipper must
exploit the information for personal gain, which may be financial or
reputational.82 The Court went further, noting that the relationship
between the parties may imply personal gain for the tipper.83 For
example, providing material, nonpublic information to a relative or
friend who trades on the information is unlawful because the insider
73. Id. at 654.
74. Id. at 654 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–35 (1980)).
75. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1977)).
76. Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)) (explaining that
the secret profit stems from such deceptive behavior).
77. Id. at 655.
78. Id.
79. Id. The SEC argued that Dirks breached a duty when he knowingly received
confidential information from insiders at Equity Funding, which placed him, and
similar tippees, in the same position as insiders once he knowingly transmitted that
information to a likely trader. Id. at 655–56.
80. Id. at 657.
81. Id. at 658–59.
82. Id. at 659, 663.
83. Id. at 664.
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has effectively traded for himself and given the profits to the relative or
friend.84 Additionally, the Court stated that for a tippee to be liable for
unlawful insider trading, the tippee must know or have reason to know
that the tipper reaped such a gain.85 If a tippee does not have reason
to know that the tipper profited from the transaction, the actions of
the tippee cannot be related back to the tipper’s improper conduct
and, therefore, the tippee has not violated section 10(b).86
Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court first noted that
Dirks, an outsider to Equity Funding, owed no fiduciary duty to its
shareholders.87 Because he did not breach a duty when he passed the
information to his clients, no liability attached as a result of those
disclosures.88 The Court then turned to the actions of Secrist, who
received no personal benefit for providing the information about
Equity Funding to Dirks.89 Rather, Secrist’s desire to expose the
fraud motivated the disclosure.90 Absent any personal gain on
Secrist’s part, no derivative liability arose against Dirks.91
b.

The dissenting opinion

Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined.92 Justice Blackmun observed that
Secrist’s intent in disclosing the fraud to Dirks was to trigger sales of
Equity Funding stock by Dirks’s clients and thus force the SEC to
recognize the fraud.93 According to Justice Blackmun, Secrist
accomplished by proxy what the law forbade him to do directly.94
Under these facts, Dirks committed unlawful insider trading.95
Justice Blackmun argued cogently that the majority’s analytic error

84. Id. Whether tipping a relative or friend constitutes a benefit to the tipper is
unsettled. Compare United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)
(holding that a tip to a relative or friend is not sufficient in itself to constitute a
benefit to the tipper), with United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding that such a close personal relationship is sufficient), cert. granted, 136
S. Ct. 899 (2016).
85. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
86. Id. at 661.
87. Id. at 665.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 666–67.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 669.
94. Id. at 671.
95. Id.
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was holding that, for liability to arise, the insider must benefit from
the disclosure.96 The duty to abstain from trading on inside
information does not depend on motives; rather, it seeks to avoid
harm by prohibiting the trade.97 An Equity Funding shareholder who
bought stock from Dirks’s clients was injured regardless of Secrist’s
motives in disclosing the information to Dirks.98
The conflict between the Newman and Salman decisions
Dirks seemed to have made clear that when a tipper provided inside
information to a friend or relative who traded on the information, the
tipper received a benefit sufficient to trigger liability. Despite the apparent
clarity of this rule, the Second Circuit in Newman held otherwise.
2.

a.

The Newman decision

In United States v. Newman, the government alleged that insiders
from Dell and NVIDIA disclosed to financial analysts the earnings of
both companies before releasing the information to the public.99
After extensive tipping chains, Newman and Chiasson, both portfolio
managers, received the Dell and NVIDIA information, traded on it,
and profited $4 million and $68 million respectively.100
Newman and Chiasson argued that they had not violated insider
trading law because the original tippers did not receive a personal
benefit.101
The principal issue was whether providing inside
information to a friend, absent acquiring a more tangible benefit
from the friend making a trade on that information, met the Dirks
benefit requirement.102 The original tipper of the Dell information
was Rob Ray, who passed the information to his friend, Sandy
Goyal.103 The Second Circuit noted that the two were not “close”
friends, though they had known each other for years, having
attended the same business school and having worked together at
96. Id.
97. Id. at 674–75 (citing Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 273 (1951))
(analogizing Secrist’s conduct to that of a trustee who is liable for a breach of
fiduciary duty to his or her beneficiaries regardless of fault and regardless of whether
the trustee benefited from the breach of fiduciary duty, and thus arguing that the law
should hold corporate fiduciaries to the same standard).
98. Id. at 671.
99. 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 444 (arguing also that the evidence did not prove they knew the
original tipper received a personal benefit).
102. Id. at 447.
103. Id. at 443.
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Dell.104 Hyung Lim, the original NVIDIA tipper, provided the
information to Chris Choi, a family friend Lim met at church and
with whom Lim occasionally socialized.105 Yet, the Second Circuit
dismissed the government’s contention that these relationships met
the personal benefit requirement of Dirks.106 The court stated: “[W]e
hold that such an inference is impermissible in the absence of proof
of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”107
b.

The Salman decision

In United States v. Salman, the Ninth Circuit, unlike the Second
Circuit, held that providing inside information to a friend, even
without acquiring a more tangible gain, may satisfy Dirks.108 In
Salman, Maher Kara, a healthcare investment banking employee at
Citigroup, shared material, nonpublic information with his brother,
Michael.109 Maher became engaged to Salman’s sister and, over the
course of the engagement, Salman and Michael became close
friends.110 Michael then shared with Salman information he had
received from Maher.111 Rather than trading in his own brokerage
account, Salman traded through the account of his wife’s sister and
her husband, Karim Bayyouk.112 Salman and Bayyouk split the
profits, which totaled approximately $1.7 million.113 When Salman
asked Michael who furnished the information, Michael revealed that
Maher was the source.114 The government proved at trial that (1)
Maher and Michael had a close personal relationship, and (2)
Salman knew the nature of that relationship.115
The principal issue in the case was whether the relationship
between Maher and Michael was sufficient to meet the personal
benefit prong of Dirks.116 Salman urged the Ninth Circuit to adopt
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 452.
Id. at 443, 452.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 452.
792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
Id. at 1088–89.
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1089–90.
Id. at 1091.
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the holding of Newman, which rejected the proposition that
disclosing inside information to a trading relative or friend per se
constitutes a personal benefit.117 Rather, Salman urged that Dirks
requires that when information is passed to a relative or friend, the
tip must carry the potential of a financial or reputational benefit.118
The Ninth Circuit held that, to the extent that Salman’s reading of
Newman was correct, such a holding was inconsistent with Dirks.119 To
dispel any doubt that its interpretation of Dirks was sound, the Ninth
Circuit quoted Dirks, which stated: “The elements of fiduciary duty
and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider
makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend.”120 Dirks, according to the Ninth Circuit, required nothing
more than the relationship.121
Salman filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.122 One of the questions
presented was whether a family relationship or friendship, standing
alone, meets the personal benefit requirement of Dirks.123 The Supreme
Court granted the petition, limiting the appeal to that issue.124
Dirks appears to answer the question raised in Salman. The
Supreme Court made clear that a personal relationship, whether
arising from family or friendship, confers a benefit on the tipper.125
The Second Circuit in Newman interpreted this language as “indicating
that the tipper’s gain need not be immediately pecuniary,” but that “the
personal benefit received in exchange for confidential information
must be of some consequence.”126 This reading of Dirks seems

117. Id. at 1093.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1093–94 (finding the Second Circuit’s holding untenable and pointing
out the absurd conclusion of Salman’s theory that “a corporate insider or other
person in possession of confidential and proprietary information would be free to
disclose that information to her relatives, and they would be free to trade on it,
provided only that she asked for no tangible compensation in return”).
120. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983); Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092–93
(noting that the Newman decision quoted that dispositive language, and suggesting
that the Second Circuit effectively conceded its misinterpretation of Dirks).
121. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093.
122. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Salman v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016)
(No. 15-628).
123. Id. at 11.
124. Salman, 136 S. Ct. at 899.
125. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
126. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 122, at 13 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662) (“[T]he test
is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders.”).
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doubtful. Dirks did not dwell on the intimacy of a relationship or the
likelihood of future gains.127 Tipping any relative or friend would
seem, under Dirks, to constitute a personal benefit.128 The same
conclusion follows from a policy point of view. To allow a person with
inside information to feed that information to a friend or relative
would further tarnish an already discredited securities marketplace.129
Though the issue of whether tipping a relative or friend is an
important one, Salman and Newman implicitly raise even more
fundamental questions. For example, why is any benefit to the tippee
required to establish unlawful insider trading under section 10(b)?
Even more important is the central question: Are the classical,
misappropriation, and tipper/tippee theories sensible applications of
section 10(b)? Part II of this Article discusses these questions.
II. THE INCOHERENCE OF INSIDER TRADING LAW
Fashioned by a series of Supreme Court decisions, the regime
establishing liability for insider trading is deeply flawed. As shown
below, the major decisions—Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Dirks—are riddled
with incoherence. If section 10(b) is the vehicle for establishing
insider trading law, it must be applied in a wholly new manner.130

127. Even so, sometimes the evidence shows a benefit meeting Newman’s
restrictive standard. In SEC v. Payton, the jury found two former brokers liable for
insider trading. 97 F. Supp. 3d 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). See Patricia Hurtado, SEC
Overcomes Tougher Insider Standards in Broker Suit, 48 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 459
(Feb. 29, 2016) (reporting that the SEC did not rely merely on a friendship to prove
that the tipper received a benefit and that the original tipper received monetary
benefits from his tippee including a reduction in rent).
128. Compare SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (taking an
expansive reading of the Dirks benefit requirement), SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 632
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that providing inside information to a trading friend meets
the Dirks benefit requirement), and United States v. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1354,
1376 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (declining to follow the Newman court’s interpretation of the
Dirks benefit requirement), with SEC v. McGinnis, No. 5:14-cv-6, 2015 WL 5643186, at
*18 (D. Vt. Sept 23, 2015) (stating that Newman made clear that a mere friendship,
particularly if casual, does not meet the Dirks benefit requirement), and SEC v.
Holley, No. 11-0205, 2015 WL 5554788, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2015) (following the
Newman court’s interpretation of the Dirks benefit requirement).
129. See Heidi Moore, Wall Street and Washington Want You to Believe the Stock Market
Isn’t Rigged. Guess What? It Still Is, GUARDIAN (June 22, 2014, 7:45 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/22/wall-street-washingtonstock-market-rigged-investors (commenting on the erosion of investor confidence in
the securities markets).
130. See infra Part III.

DAVIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

68

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/31/2016 8:12 PM

[Vol. 66:51

A. The Deficiencies of the Classical Theory
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to use “any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security.131 The Chiarella Court held that when a corporate
insider trades on material, nonpublic information, the insider has
breached a duty to the company and its shareholders.132 The insider
has therefore engaged in a deception in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.133 A breach of fiduciary duty has
occurred because the insider has, without authorization, effectively
converted corporate information and used it for his own profit.134 By
doing so, the corporate insider, similar to the unfaithful trustee, has
violated the duty of loyalty and fairness to shareholders.135 There is,
however, a conceptual flaw in linking insider trading liability to a
breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. It is
analytically suspect to make the wrong that gives rise to an insider
trading violation something other than the trade itself.136 In other
words, the wrong should be the fraud perpetrated on the
counterparty to the trade rather than an entirely separate wrong
inflicted on the source of the information.
SEC v. Zandford,137 however, seems to contradict the premise that
the deception on the source of the inside information should be
superfluous to an insider trading violation. Zandford was a securities
fraud case rather than an insider trading case.138 It is nevertheless
relevant because Zandford held that, under appropriate
circumstances, a broker who stole funds from his clients could be
liable for securities fraud, though he did not commit a fraud about

131. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
132. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
133. Id.
134. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26–27 (1987) (holding that a
fraud can be perpetrated by depriving a business the exclusive use of its own
confidential information).
135. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 193 (1991) (arguing that, like a trustee, the insider has
a duty of “utmost fairness” to the corporation and its shareholders (quoting GEORGE
T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 96, at 348 (6th ed. 1987))).
136. See Adam R. Nelson, Note, Extending Outsider Trading Liability to Thieves, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2187 (2012) (observing that “[r]equiring a breach of duty
between the misappropriator and the source of the information is unrelated to the
purpose of the prohibition: to protect investors and the integrity of the market”).
137. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
138. Id. at 815.
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the securities themselves.139 It might follow by analogy that in an
insider trading case the fraud need not concern the trade.
The facts of the case are instructive. Charles Zandford, a securities
broker, persuaded William Wood, an elderly man in poor health, to
open a brokerage account for himself and his mentally infirm
daughter.140 The Woods entrusted $419,000 to Zandford, conferring
on Zandford the authority to trade securities without prior
approval.141 Zandford then sold securities from the Woods’ account
and transferred all the proceeds to his own account.142 Though
admitting to the misappropriation of funds, Zandford argued that
the theft was not “in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security” because he neither misrepresented nor omitted any
information about a security.143 The securities transactions, he
argued, were incidental to his scheme, which was to steal the Woods’
funds.144 The Supreme Court saw the issue differently, holding that
Zandford’s scheme was unitary; his plan from the beginning was to
purchase securities for the Woods’ account, liquidate the securities,
and misappropriate the proceeds.145 The fraud was therefore in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.146
At first glance, Zandford might seem to support the current law of
insider trading. The deceptive device in Zandford was the theft of the
proceeds from the sale of securities in the Woods’ account; there was
no fraud regarding the securities themselves. By analogy, under the
current law of insider trading, the fraud is a breach of confidentiality
on the source of the information; there is no fraud regarding the
trade. There is, however, a critical distinction between the Zandford
case and insider trading cases: in an insider trading case, the victim
of the trade is the counterparty, whereas in Zandford the victims of the
trades were Wood and his daughter. Thus, in Zandford, unlike
current insider trading law, the injury was linked to the fraud.
Another distinction between Zandford and insider trading cases is
that unlawful insider trading differs significantly from ordinary

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 820.
Id. at 815.
Id.
Id. at 815–16.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820–21.
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violations of section 10(b).147 An insider trading violation requires
more than fraud in connection with a purchase or sale of a security. It
requires the exploitation of material, nonpublic information in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security.148 Because of this additional
element, the deceit should connect directly to the insider’s trade.
By focusing on a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders, Chiarella ignores the real victim of the insider trade:
the counterparty.
Whatever injury the corporation and its
shareholders suffer from an insider’s breach of fiduciary duty, the
injury is not the result of the insider’s trade. The corporation and its
shareholders would have suffered the same injury regardless of
whether the insider ever traded on the information. By way of
analogy, if a man steals a woman’s purse, whether he sells the purse
to a third party is irrelevant to her claim for relief.
1.

The harm to the counterparty
The Supreme Court has unmoored what constitutes an insider
trading violation from the trade itself and the harm the trade causes.
The injuries the law should seek to prevent are the deception on the
counterparty and the inevitable loss in investor confidence. Whether
the counterparty actually suffers any injury at all, however, has been a
controversial question.
The counterparty has the expectation that the system will not be
rigged and that insiders will not use informational advantages;149
however, not all informational advantages are unfair, and those who
acquire and subsequently trade on inside information are not
necessarily engaging in deceptive conduct. Participants in securities
markets understand that traders operate with asymmetries of
information. Parties conduct research and gather information hoping
to gain an advantage.150 As the Supreme Court has recognized, such
asymmetries of information are inherent to healthy securities
147. See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider
Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 440 (characterizing insider trading as a sui
generis form of securities fraud).
148. United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011).
149. See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A PostChiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982) (noting that ordinary traders feel
that when their counterparties are armed with inside information, their
counterparties are unjustly enriched).
150. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657–58 (1983) (noting that imposing liability
on all market participants who knowingly receive and trade on inside information
“could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC
itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market”).
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markets.151 A general ban on insider trading would suppress market
research and punish market participants who have the skill to
independently discover material, nonpublic information.152
Exploiting informational advantages arising from positions of power
and access, however, is unfair. Insider trading law should punish
insiders who trade on such information or provide the information to
tippees who trade on the information. For example, suppose Trader
A, owning shares of Mega Corporation, sells his stock to Trader B, who
has inside information that Mega will soon release a blockbuster
quarterly earnings report far exceeding Wall Street projections. When
the parties make the trade, Mega is fifty dollars per share. When Mega
publicly discloses the information one week later, the stock soars to
sixty dollars per share. Trader A would have made ten dollars per
share if he had not sold his Mega stock to Trader B.
Suppose further that Trader A buys shares of Mega from Trader B,
who has information that Mega will soon release a dismal quarterly
earnings report and provide negative forward guidance. One week
later, when Mega discloses the negative information, the stock plummets
from fifty dollars per share to forty dollars per share. Again, Trader A
has suffered a loss of ten dollars per share, which he would not have
sustained had Trader B publicly disclosed the inside information.
In both cases, the counterparty suffered an injury, and the injury
would have been averted if the insider had followed the disclose-orabstain rule. In neither case, however, did the trade injure the source
of the information.
2.

Counterarguments
Some argue that insider trading does not injure the
counterparty.153 They point out that the counterparty decides to
trade or not to trade irrespective of whatever action the insider
takes.154 Thus, in the first illustration above, Trader A decided to sell
151. See id. (rejecting the premise that the antifraud provisions of federal
securities law “require equal information among all traders”).
152. See J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading: United States v. Newman
and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1424 (2015) (supporting the Supreme
Court’s inclusion of a duty element in insider trading law because such an element
frees someone innocently possessing inside information from criminal culpability).
153. See, e.g., Leo Katz, The Problem with Consenting to Insider Trading, 69 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 827, 831 (2015) (arguing that when a company endorses insider trading,
shareholders and non-shareholder traders assume the risk as they would in any
situation where a party voluntarily accepts a known risk).
154. James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago
School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 635 (observing that “the investor is no worse off when the
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his shares of Mega irrespective of Trader B’s actions. It may be true
that if Trader A had the inside information he would not have sold
his shares, but whether the insider abstained from trading or not, the
outcome for Trader A would have been the same. Like reasoning
applies to the second illustration, where Trader A bought Mega
shares in advance of a negative disclosure; his decision would have
been the same whether Trader B traded or did not trade.
Thus, deciding whether the counterparty sustained a loss depends
on one’s perspective. If one focuses on the effect of disclosure versus
nondisclosure of the inside information, the counterparty suffers a
loss. If, on the other hand, one focuses on whether the insider
traded or did not trade, the counterparty incurs no loss.155
Advocates of insider trading discount any injury to the
counterparty because, they argue, the overall benefits of insider
trading outweigh its overall harm. They point out that insider
trading often results in higher share prices over time, which benefits
most shareholders.156 Similarly, non-insider buyers who purchase
shares before the dissemination of the inside information benefit
from insider trading once the information is publicly disclosed.157
Some justify insider trading by arguing that the profits from such
trading are a form of executive compensation. By developing and
implementing successful business strategies, corporate executives
generate valuable inside information. It is fitting, some argue, that they
benefit from the very information they create. Allowing executives to
reap the benefit of their contributions provides them with an incentive
to continue to develop innovative products and services.158

insider trades than when the insider does not trade [because t]he investor’s decision
to sell or purchase is unaffected by whether the insider is also secretly buying or
selling shares in the open market”).
155. See William K.S. Wang, The Importance of “The Law of Conservation of Securities”:
A Reply to John P. Anderson’s “What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?”, 69 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 811, 812–14 (2015) (describing how counterparties to insider trading
are or are not injured).
156. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 102 (1966)
(“[T]here is both a plus and a minus for outside sellers from insider trading. The
plus is the higher price received by those who would have otherwise sold at the
stable, lower price, and the minus is the number of sales that now occur but which
otherwise would not have occurred.”).
157. Id. at 103 (“We must add to the plus side of the equation the gain resulting to
noninside buyers . . . as these individuals are benefited to the same extent as inside
buyers, if they hold their shares until [the inside information is publicly disclosed].”).
158. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 46 (1986) (noting that an “entrepreneur’s
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3.

Confidence in the securities markets
Despite these back and forth arguments, the sounder conclusion is
that the counterparty is injured and that such injury requires a robust
insider trading law. A primary reason for insider trading law is to foster
confidence in the securities markets.159 A party trading on material,
nonpublic information deceives the counterparty who reasonably
expects securities markets to be fair and not to condone insiders
exploiting informational advantages. Investors deserve evenhanded
markets and laws that provide every investor with an equal chance to
prosper. Like civil rights law, securities law should not guarantee
equality of results, but it should guarantee equality of opportunity.160
In the domain of securities law, this means equal access to material
information. Traders who see their investments dwindle feel cheated
when beset with an informational disadvantage spawned by unequal
access. If the ordinary investor had access to the material information
that the insider used, then the ordinary investor would have acted
differently and would have benefitted from the information.
Ordinary investors feel that the system is rigged.161 They believe
that corporate insiders have an advantage that renders trading
securities a game of Russian roulette. When investor distrust of the
securities markets swells, their willingness to invest falters, trading
volume sinks, stock prices fall, and fewer new issues come to
market.162 This integrity-of-the-markets argument presents a sound

compensation must have a reasonable relation to the value of his contribution to give
him incentive to produce more information”).
159. See generally Spencer Derek Klein, Note, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making,
and the Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665 (1988) (analyzing the
different variables that affect consumer confidence in the securities markets,
including insider trading violations).
160. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (stressing that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 strives to achieve equality of opportunity but
not equality of result); Kenneth R. Davis, Wheel of Fortune: A Critique of the “Manifest
Imbalance” Requirement for Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 43 GA. L.
REV. 993, 1038 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to
“reconcile[] equality of opportunity with meritocracy”).
161. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 357 (1979) (reporting that inside
information harms public investors and discourages their entry into the markets,
which raises the cost of acquiring capital).
162. See Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal,
Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 235 (1992) (noting that
“[u]nconstrained opportunism based on information asymmetry almost inevitably
causes market failure,” and that “[e]ven in the absence of a stock market crash,
information asymmetry is likely to squeeze smaller shareholders from stock market
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rationale for an approach to insider trading law that is stricter than
the current regime under section 10(b).
B. The Deficiencies of the Misappropriation Theory
The same problems that plague the classical theory apply with equal,
if not greater, force to the misappropriation theory. Before discussing
these deficiencies, however, it is useful to examine the case that
presaged the misappropriation theory: Carpenter v. United States.163 In
Carpenter, R. Foster Winans, a Wall Street Journal reporter partly
responsible for preparing the touted “Heard on the Street” column,
provided advance notice of the column to others who traded on the
information.164 Based on these unauthorized communications, Winans
was charged with mail fraud and wire fraud.165
The Supreme Court held that the contents of the column were
business property and that the use or disclosure of that information,
without the permission of the Journal, was misappropriation of that
property.166 Winans, as an employee of the Journal, had a fiduciary
duty not to misappropriate such information.167 The Court rejected
Winans’s argument that his conduct caused no harm to the Journal;168
the harm, the Court believed, was depriving the Journal of the
exclusive use of the column.169
It is hard to see, however, how the Journal was harmed. It maintained
the power to use the information any way it wished despite the
misappropriation because, unlike tangible property, both the owner and
the misappropriator may use the information simultaneously.

participation when they discover that they cannot achieve normal returns in an
environment of windfall profits realized by unfairly advantaged traders”); see also H.L.
Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8 MICH. L. REV.
267, 297 (1910) (observing that when a director trades on inside information, he or
she “offends the moral sense; no shareholder expects to be so treated by the director
he selects; no director would urge his friends to select him for that reason; that the
law yet allows him to do this, does more to discourage legitimate investment in
corporate shares than almost anything else”).
163. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
164. Id. at 23.
165. Id. at 24.
166. Id. at 25, 28; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997)
(holding that “[a] company’s confidential information . . . qualifies as property to
which the company has a right of exclusive use”).
167. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27–28.
168. Id. at 26.
169. Id.
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As Chiarella and O’Hagan demonstrate, the Court believes that the
way the trader acquired the information is critical to determining the
scope of liability.170 It is understandable why the Court has
endeavored to limit the scope of insider trading liability to situations
where the party trading on inside information has wrongfully
acquired information. Sometimes researchers acquire information
legitimately, but the limiting principle that the Supreme Court has
adopted—deception on the source—is particularly misguided in
misappropriation cases.171 One problem is that the Court’s limiting
principle is under-inclusive.172 For example, if the source of
information encourages the tippee to trade on the information, the
tippee would not have breached a duty to the source of the
information by trading; hence, the tippee is not guilty of
misappropriation. It makes no sense to determine liability based on
whether the source permitted or forbade the tippee to trade. In both
situations, the harm inflicted on the counterparty and on the public’s
confidence in the securities markets is the same.173

170. See supra Sections I.A–B (describing the evolution of the classical and
misappropriation theories).
171. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and the
New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REV. 775,
830 (1988) (noting that misappropriation seems to have little relevance to securities
fraud unless the source of the misappropriated information traded with the
misappropriator); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1496 (1999) (recognizing that “O’Hagan worked a vast,
unwitting, and wholly unwarranted expansion of Rule 10b-5 to reach deceptions of
parties wholly outside of and unconnected to the securities markets”).
172. The SEC has mitigated this problem to some extent by promulgating Rule
10b5-2. This rule establishes for purposes of section 10(b) liability a presumption of
misappropriation under defined circumstances. Rule 10b5-2 provides that a duty of
confidence exists under the following nonexclusive circumstances:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2)
Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information
and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or
practice of sharing confidences . . . ; or (3) Whenever a person receives or
obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent,
child, or sibling . . . .
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1)–(3) (2015). No duty arises under the third category,
however, if the recipient, based on the parties’ history or understanding, did not
reasonably believe the information was conveyed with an expectation of
confidentiality. Id.
173. See Bryan S. Schultz, Note, Feigning Fidelity to Section 10(b): Insider Trading
Liability After United States v. O’Hagan, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1411, 1435 (1998) (arguing
that “[u]nlike the established parameters of the classical theory of insider trading
liability, the misappropriation theory ignores the plight of the deceived investor”).
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Another inadequacy of the current approach is that it does not
clearly forbid trading on stolen information.174 The Second Circuit
confronted this situation in SEC v. Dorozhko.175 A trader hacked into a
server and acquired the earnings report of IMS Health before the
report’s public release.176 Based on this report, the hacker, Oleksandr
Dorozhko, purchased IMS put options and scored a profit of more
than $286,000.177 The district court held that because Dorozhko did
not breach a fiduciary duty or a duty of confidence to either IMS or
Thomson Financial, the owner of the server, he did not use a
“deceptive device” within the meaning of section 10(b).178 Taking a
dubiously expansive view of “deceptive device” in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, the Second Circuit disagreed, holding
that misrepresenting one’s identity to gain access to a server is a
deception under section 10(b).179 Regardless of the Second Circuit’s
analytical bootstrapping, the court reached the sensible result.
Dorozhko used the inside information to gain an unfair informational
advantage, thereby injuring the counterparty and potentially harming
investor confidence in the securities markets.180
C. The Deficiencies of the Tipper/Tippee Theory
Justice Blackmun was correct in arguing that the majority in Dirks
erred when it rested liability on whether the tipper gained a benefit
from the trade.181 This Article has argued that an insider’s breach of
fiduciary duty to the corporation, though wrongful, is wholly
unconnected to any injury the insider caused by trading on inside
information. Even accepting, arguendo, the premise that such a
174. See Nelson, supra note 136, at 2190–92 (noting that the liability of thieves for
trading on inside information is unsettled and arguing that holding thieves liable
under section 10(b) is a “logical extension” of existing doctrine).
175. 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
176. Id. at 44.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 45.
179. Id. at 51.
180. See id. at 49 (characterizing the SEC’s argument about Dorozhko’s
misrepresentation as a “straightforward theory of fraud”); Mark F. DiGiovanni, Note,
Weeding out a New Theory of Insider Trading Liability and Cultivating an Heirloom Variety:
A Proposed Response to SEC v. Dorozhko, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 596–97 (2012)
(arguing that a “constructive breach” theory correctly places Dorozhko within the
Supreme Court’s analytical framework because the theory creates a fiduciary duty on
the part of one who wrongfully obtains property from another).
181. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 671–73 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The
fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach does not eradicate the
shareholder’s injury.”).
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breach of confidentiality should be a pre-requisite to liability, the
additional requirement that the insider derive a benefit from the
trade adds yet another level of dysfunction to an already muddled
framework. If someone aids and abets a robbery, for example, his
guilt does not turn on whether he received some of the booty. In no
other context does a breach of fiduciary duty hinge on whether the
fiduciary derived a benefit from his wrongdoing. Breaches of the
duty of loyalty, care, and good faith depend on the conduct of the
fiduciary rather than on whether the breach was profitable.182 For
example, if the CEO of Corporation A is secretly serving as CEO for
rival Corporation B, it is not a defense that he was serving as CEO of
Corporation B free of charge.
As demonstrated, the law of insider trading condones various cases
of knowingly trading on inside information. Current law imposes
objectionable liability requirements: there must be a breach of a
fiduciary duty or confidentiality to the source, and, in tipper/tippee
cases, the tipper must gain a benefit. This Article proposes that the
Cady, Roberts fraud-on-the-market theory could rectify the conceptual
anomalies that plague the current framework.183
III. THE CADY, ROBERTS DUTY AND FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY
The question remains how to redirect the focus of insider trading
law away from a breach of fiduciary duty to the source and toward a
breach of duty to the counterparty. One obstacle to this refocusing is
the lack of a direct interaction between parties trading in impersonal,
computerized markets.
A. The Affiliated Ute Citizens Presumption of Reliance
The Court’s reasoning in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States
provides a possible solution to this problem by creating a
presumption of reliance in omission cases.184 In that case, members
of the Ute tribe owned shares of Ute Distribution Corp. (“UDC”), a

182. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921–23, 925–26 (Del. 2000)
(reinstating shareholders’ claims against directors for breach of fiduciary duties of
loyalty, care, and good faith for failure to maximize shareholder value in
recommending sale of chemical corporation); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 351 (Del. 1993) (remanding a case to the trial court where the plaintiff
argued that the directors breached the duties of loyalty and care by approving a cashout merger), modified on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
183. See infra Part III.
184. 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
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company with oil, gas, and mineral rights.185 First Security Bank of
Utah was the transfer agent of UDC.186 Two assistant managers of the
bank purchased UDC shares from tribe members at depressed prices,
failing to disclose the market price.187 The issue was whether the
plaintiffs failed to meet the reliance element of section 10(b), and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder, because the fraud was based on omissions,
not affirmative misrepresentations.188
The Tenth Circuit held that someone cannot rely on an omission
because one cannot rely on what a party failed to disclose.189 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in a material omission case,
section 10(b) did not require affirmative proof of reliance.190 To
infer reliance, a court had to find that a reasonable investor might
have considered the undisclosed information important in making an
investment decision.191 Because the market price of the stock would
have been important to someone deciding whether to sell it, the two
assistant bank managers in Affiliated Ute Citizens had a duty to disclose
the market price of the stock to the Ute tribe members who sold
stock to them.192
There is, however, a potential objection to applying the Affiliated
Ute Citizens reliance presumption to insider trading cases: because
the parties to trades do not deal directly with each other, it would
seem unreasonable to require the insider to make disclosures to an
unidentified counterparty. Failing to make such disclosures would
therefore not reasonably seem to constitute a breach of duty. If, on the
other hand, the presumption of reliance attaches automatically to every
market participant, one might question whether such a presumption is
justified where a market is inefficient. Such a market might not absorb
and take account of material information. The disclosure would
therefore never have reached the counterparty. To meet this objection,
one might propose an approach more tenable than the Affiliated Ute
Citizens presumption of reliance. This approach, which considers
185. Id. at 136.
186. Id. at 145.
187. Id. at 146–47.
188. Id. at 152.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 153.
191. Id. at 153–54.
192. Id. at 153. Judge Spatt followed this approach in In re Sterling Foster & Co.,
222 F. Supp. 2d 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), a class action suit alleging unlawful insider
trading based on material omissions. Id. at 275 (stating that “[b]ecause the
complaint is based on the defendants’ failure to disclose material facts, reliance is
presumed”).
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market efficiency, is fraud-on-the-market theory based on the Cady,
Roberts duty to disclose material, nonpublic information.193
B. The Cady, Roberts Duty to Disclose or Abstain
In re Cady, Roberts & Co. was an administrative proceeding in which
the SEC charged Robert Gintel, a partner of a broker-dealer firm, with
unlawful insider trading.194 Gintel had learned of a cut in the
dividends of Curtis-Wright, a company traded on the NYSE.195 Based
on this nonpublic information, Gintel exercised his discretionary
authority to sell his clients’ Curtis-Wright stock.196 The SEC found that
Gintel had violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.197 In so holding, the
SEC issued a pronouncement that has shaped securities law:
We[] and the courts have consistently held that insiders must
disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their
position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal
and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.
Failure to make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a
violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other hand,
disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper
or unrealistic under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is
to forego the transaction.198

This requirement—either to publicly disclose material information
or abstain from trading—is the duty on which to base insider trading
law. When people trade a security based on inside information, they
breach the Cady, Roberts duty of disclosure. Such a material omission
is a deception that violates section 10(b).199

193. See infra Section III.B–C; see also supra text accompanying note 21 (suggesting
that fraud-on-the-market theory might be applied to insider trading cases).
194. 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (1961).
195. Id. at 909.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 911, 917–18. The SEC found that Gintel’s wrongful conduct was willful.
Id. at 917. As a mitigating factor, the SEC also found that the leak of the information
to Gintel was not planned. Therefore, in addition to the $3,000 fine imposed by the
NYSE, the SEC suspended Gintel from the NYSE for only twenty days. Id.
Commissioner Frear found the suspension insufficient. Id. at 918.
198. Id. at 911 (footnote omitted).
199. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–53 (1972)
(holding that Rule 10(b) may be violated absent a material misrepresentation of fact).
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C. Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
The Supreme Court established fraud-on-the-market theory in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson.200 Beginning in 1976, Basic engaged in merger
talks with Combustion Engineering, but Basic issued three public
When Basic
statements denying these merger negotiations.201
announced a tender offer from Combustion Engineering in
December of 1978, Basic’s stock rose.202 Former Basic shareholders
who had sold their shares before Basic announced the tender offer
sued under section 10(b), alleging that they sold at depressed
prices.203 The issue was whether, in this class action, the law could
presume that the plaintiffs relied on the three public statements
denying merger negotiations.204
Adopting fraud-on-the-markettheory, the Court established a rebuttable presumption of reliance.205
To explain the presumption, the Court quoted Peil v. Speiser206:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s
stock is determined by the available material information regarding
the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not
directly rely on the misstatements. . . . The causal connection
between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock
in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance
on misrepresentations.207

200. 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988). For a further discussion of fraud-on-the-market
case law, see infra notes 217–28 and accompanying text (discussing Halliburton Co.
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416–17 (2014)).
201. Basic, 485 U.S. at 227; see also id. at 241–42 (discussing factors to help
delineate when a market is efficient or, in the words of Basic, “open and developed,”
and explaining that such markets are entitled to the presumption raised by fraud-onthe-market theory); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989)
(articulating five factors to help determine the applicability of fraud-on-the-market
theory: (1) high average trading volume of the security in question (a volume of two
percent of the public float would justify a strong presumption of market efficiency);
(2) the number of securities analysts following the security in question; (3) the
number of markets on which the security in question trades; (4) the entitlement of
the company in question to file an S-3 Registration Statement with the SEC; and (5)
the immediacy of a reaction in the price of the security in question to unexpected
corporate events or informational releases).
202. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 242.
205. Id.
206. 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986).
207. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–42 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61).
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The presumption is not absolute. It applies only when a market is
well-developed
and
therefore
efficient
in
disseminating
information.208 Such efficiency assures that the information will
affect the price of the security in question.209 As the Court observed,
“Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’s premise
that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets
reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations.”210 The Court pointed out that the defendants
might have rebutted this presumption in several ways.211 For
example, if the defendants could have proven that the market makers
knew about the merger talks, their knowledge would have corrected
any distortion of the stock price in the marketplace.212 Similarly, a
below-fair-value market price would have been eliminated if news of
the merger negotiations had filtered into the marketplace.213 A third
example would be if the plaintiffs should have known of the merger
negotiations but sold anyway for other reasons such as potential
antitrust concerns or political pressure.214
Although Basic was a material misrepresentation case, the
rebuttable presumption of fraud-on-the-market theory also applies to
material omission cases.215 Insider trading cases involve material
omissions; thus, the party trading on inside information has a Cady,
Roberts duty to publicly disclose the inside information.216 A failure to
meet this duty in an efficient market affects every party who owns or
trades the relevant security.

208. Id. at 247.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 246.
211. Id. at 248.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 249.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that
“the presumption of reliance is available only when a plaintiff alleges that a
defendant made material representations or omissions concerning a security that is
actively traded in an ‘efficient market,’ thereby establishing a ‘fraud on the
market’”); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1990)
(stating that “[o]ne of the circumstances justifying a presumption of reliance arises
when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant made material representations or omissions
concerning a security that is actively traded on an efficient market, thereby
establishing a fraud on the market”); In re Sterling Foster & Co., 222 F. Supp. 2d 216,
274–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing the applicability of fraud-on-the-market theory
to a case involving both material misrepresentations and omissions).
216. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
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The Supreme Court in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.217
The
reaffirmed and elaborated fraud-on-the-market theory.218
Halliburton Court addressed two principal arguments.
First,
Halliburton questioned the Basic Court’s premise of the efficient
dissemination of information in securities markets.219 Halliburton
argued that recent empirical evidence showed that some publicly
disclosed information is not absorbed immediately into the
markets.220 The Court dispensed with this argument, noting that
under fraud-on-the-market theory, the presumption of reliance is
rebuttable.221
If a defendant proves that publicly disclosed
information did not reach or affect investors, the party would rebut
the presumption of reliance.222 The second argument questioned
whether most investors rely on the integrity of the market.223
Halliburton cited so-called value investors, day traders, and volatility
arbitragers as examples of investors who are largely indifferent to
market information.224 For example, day traders, who seek out and
buy undervalued stocks, concentrate on long-term upward trends
they perceive in the prices of securities rather than on passing

217. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
218. Id. at 2417.
219. Id. at 2409. The Supreme Court pointed out that Basic never characterized
market efficiency as binary. Id. Because the Court recognized that market efficiency
is imperfect, it made the presumption of reliance rebuttable and subject to the
evidence bearing on the circumstances raised in any particular litigation. Id. at 2410.
See Baruch Lev and Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal,
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20 (1994) (arguing that capital
markets are not fundamentally efficient and, though noting significant exceptions,
stating that fundamental market information is not the primary influence on the
price of an individual stock or the market in general); see also Roberta S. Karmel,
When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in Securities Class Actions?, 63 BUS. LAW. 25, 54
(2007) (arguing that a wholesale repudiation of fraud-on-the-market theory would
weaken the effectiveness of the SEC’s integrated disclosure system and impair the
viability of worthy class actions). But see Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty:
Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 167–68 (characterizing the
application of fraud-on-the-market theory as a “judicial muddle” and arguing that
because market efficiency is not a binary, yes-or-no question, one cannot sensibly
argue in every case that material information affects market prices).
220. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2409.
221. Id. at 2410.
222. Id. at 2410–11.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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information.225 The Court answered this argument by noting again
that the Basic presumption is rebuttable, stressing that Basic merely
presumed the reliance of most, but not all, investors.226 The Court
also questioned whether any investors, including value investors, are
indifferent to the integrity of market prices.227 Such investors
ultimately rely on all available material information.228
Applying fraud-on-the-market theory to the Cady, Roberts duty to
disclose would resolve the conceptual deficiencies of current insider
trading law. This new theory of unlawful insider trading would
eliminate the requirement of establishing a breach of fiduciary duty
or confidentiality on the source of the information. A fraud-on-themarket theory of insider trading would also do away with the Dirks
requirement that the tipper receive a benefit from the trade.229 The
efficacy of fraud-on-the-market theory, however, is limited to
instances where the security in question trades on an efficient
market. Although most cases involve securities traded on efficient
markets, such as the NYSE or the NASDAQ, congressional enactment
of a law dedicated to insider trading would present an even more
comprehensive means for revamping insider trading law.
IV. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO IMPROVE INSIDER TRADING LAW
Congress should enact a new provision that, unlike section 10(b), is
dedicated specifically to insider trading. Three legislative proposals
are pending before Congress.
A. Pending Legislation
Congressman Stephen Lynch,230 Congressman James Himes,231 and
Senators Jack Reed and Robert Menendez232 have each proposed
legislation. All three will be discussed below.

225. See id. at 2410 (explaining that while false, passing statements affect the price
of a stock, market professionals focus on the “material statements about companies,”
which affect the whole market).
226. Id. at 2411.
227. Id.
228. See id. (explaining that a stock’s market price eventually reflects material
information).
229. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 (1983) (finding no violation of the Cady,
Roberts duty where employees did not obtain monetary or personal benefit for
revealing secrets).
230. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015).
231. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).
232. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015).
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1.

The Lynch bill
This bill would make it unlawful “[t]o purchase or sell any
security, . . . based on information that the person knows or . . .
should know is material information and inside information.”233 An
improvement on current insider trading law, this bill would eliminate
the requirement that the tipper receive a benefit from the tippee.234
This proposal, however, is problematic because it retains the
conceptual flaw of classical theory and misappropriation theory by
defining inside information as information that is obtained “directly
or indirectly from an issuer with an expectation of confidentiality or
that such information will only be used for a legitimate business
purposes [sic]; or in violation of a fiduciary duty.”235
2.

The Himes bill
Broader in the scope of its prohibitions than the Lynch bill, the
Himes bill would make it unlawful to purchase or sell a security while
in possession of material, nonpublic information if the person knows
or recklessly disregards that such information was obtained by theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, espionage, deception, or a breach of
fiduciary duty or confidence.236 This proposal would thus retain the
classical and misappropriation theories while expanding the list of
prohibited means for acquiring the inside information.237 This law
would make it unlawful to communicate material, nonpublic
information to another person if it was reasonably foreseeable that
the other person would purchase or sell the security using the
information or provide the information to a third party who might
foreseeably purchase or sell the security.238 A person who knew or
recklessly disregarded that such information was wrongfully obtained
or communicated has committed a violation even if the person did
not know the means through which the information was obtained or
whether the tipper received a personal benefit.239

233. H.R. 1173 § 2.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. H.R. 1625 § 2.
237. See id. (broadening the list of prohibited means to include “theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, or espionage”).
238. Id.
239. Id.
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3.

The Reed-Menendez bill
The best of the three proposals, a bill sponsored by Senators Jack
Reed and Robert Menendez, would impose an even broader insider
trading ban than the Lynch and Himes bills. This bill would make it
unlawful “[t]o purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or sale of any
security on the basis of material information that that the person
knows or has reason to know is not publicly available.”240 Because the
Reed-Menendez bill does not catalogue unlawful means of acquiring
inside information, it is preferable to the Himes bill. All that the
Reed-Menendez bill requires is that the information be material and
nonpublic.241 Like the Lynch and Himes bills, the Reed-Menendez
bill would impose a broad scope of tipper/tippee liability by making
it unlawful “[t]o knowingly or recklessly communicate material
information that the person knows or has reason to know is not
publicly available to any other person under circumstances in which
it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result
in [liability for insider trading].”242 The Dirks benefit requirements
would thus be discarded. This bill protects trading based on bona
fide research by exempting from liability a person who trades on
“information that the person has independently developed from
publicly available sources.”243
B. A Proposed Revision of the Reed-Menendez Bill
The Reed-Menendez bill, though vastly superior to the present law
of insider trading, might be improved. As noted, the bill makes it
unlawful to knowingly or recklessly communicate material
information when it is reasonably foreseeable that the recipient will
trade on the information.244 This prohibition of insider trading
unnecessarily limits potential liability in two ways.
First, the
requirement that the source of the information “knowingly or
recklessly” communicates the information should be deleted because
recklessness is an unnecessarily ambiguous standard. SEC v. Switzer245
illustrates the problematic nature of this standard.
In Switzer, Barry Switzer, the well-known head coach of the
University of Oklahoma football team, attended a track meet

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
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conducted at the university’s field.246 George Platt, who also attended
the meet, was a director of Phoenix Resources and the CEO of Texas
International, which had acquired Phoenix Resources.247 Though
Switzer and Platt knew each other and greeted each other at the
event, neither knew that the other planned to attend, and they did
not sit together.248 While in the stands, Switzer overheard Platt tell
his wife that Phoenix might be liquidated.249 Switzer passed this
information to several of his friends, and he and his friends traded
Phoenix shares and profited from the transactions.250
The district court found that Platt had unintentionally passed this
inside information to Switzer, and therefore neither he nor Switzer
violated section 10(b).251 It would seem reasonable, however, to find
that Platt violated the section by acting recklessly. One might
question why this nebulous standard should be incorporated into a
new insider trading law.252
One might go a step further: In civil cases, the mental state of the
person communicating the information to another person should
not matter in determining whether a violation has occurred.253 The
mere communication of the insider information, regardless of the
circumstances, should be enough to impose liability on the insider.
The law should impose on insiders a duty to protect the
confidentiality of material, nonpublic information. Whether acting
246. Id. at 761.
247. Id. at 758–60.
248. Id. at 761.
249. Id. at 762.
250. Id. at 762–63.
251. Id. at 762, 766.
252. The federal circuit courts have uniformly accepted a showing of recklessness
to meet the scienter requirement of a section 10(b) violation. See e.g., In re Ikon
Office Sols., Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 667 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that to meet the scienter
element of section 10(b), a plaintiff must show highly unreasonable conduct
exceeding mere negligence); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569–
70 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1044–45 (7th Cir. 1977)) (holding that an extreme departure from ordinary care
constitutes recklessness). There would be, however, no inconsistency in rejecting
recklessness as the standard of liability for communicating inside information to a
third party. In an ordinary securities fraud case, the recklessness standard applies to
the deceptive conduct, whereas—in an insider trading case—communicating insider
information is not the deceptive conduct. See Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer’s Duty
Under Rule 10b-5 to Correct and Update Materially Misleading Statements, 40 CATH. U. L.
REV. 289, 293, 300 (1991) (explaining that failure to disclose the inside information
to the counterparty constitutes the fraudulent omission).
253. In criminal cases, a higher standard of mens rea would be necessary to
support a conviction.
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with intent, recklessness, negligence, or even without fault, the
person communicating the information has failed to meet that duty
and has tacitly, if not actively, encouraged the recipient of the
information to use it for profit. Such a use undermines investor trust
in the integrity of the securities markets.254 A decline in investor trust
could result in the curtailment of trading activity and initial and
secondary public offerings.255 The current regime established in
Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Dirks has already threatened investor
confidence. A new law should, in civil cases, impose strict liability on
those who provide material, nonpublic information and those who
trade on that information. The one exception should cover instances
where the information was acquired though legitimate research.
The Reed-Menendez bill makes the communication of inside
information unlawful only “under circumstances in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in
a” prohibited insider trade.256 This qualification on liability should
also be deleted. Any time that a tipper communicates material,
nonpublic information to a third party, it follows that the third party
is reasonably likely to trade on that information. Yet, the bill implies
that the DOJ, SEC, or individual plaintiff must prove something more
than this apparent inference. Such proof might, for example, be the
recipient’s statement indicating an intention to trade. Requiring
such a statement, however, would put a nonsensical pre-condition on
liability. Tippers and tippees are sophisticated, and they quickly
catch on to the rules of the game. The law should not coach the
tippee to solemnly disavow to the tipper the intent to trade, thereby
exonerating the tipper.
If both of the changes suggested in this Article were adopted, the
relevant subsection would provide as follows: It is unlawful to
communicate nonpublic material information to any person who
trades on the basis of the communicated information, if the person
communicating the information knows or has reason to know that
the communicated information is not publicly available.257
254. See supra Section II.A.3.
255. Id.
256. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
257. This provision would impose a general restriction on insider trading similar
in scope to the ban prescribed in Rule 14e-3 for trading on inside information
relating to tender offers. Rule 14e-3(a) provides that
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the ‘offering person’), it shall constitute a
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of
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CONCLUSION
It is astonishing that federal law lacks a specific insider trading
prohibition. Congress has ceded its responsibility to the Supreme
Court, which has strained the language of section 10(b) to fashion a
federal common law of insider trading.258 Unfortunately, it is not
sound law. The Supreme Court has revealed its bias disfavoring a
broad prohibition of insider trading. It has touted the benefits of a
framework that gives wide latitude to “market research,” even when
certain “research” methods seem suspect, if not blatantly wrongful.
The current regime must be overhauled, if not abandoned. Under
present law, if someone in a restaurant overhears Tim Cook tell a
colleague that Apple will soon announce blowout earnings, the
eavesdropper may trade on the information with impunity. It is
unclear under current law whether someone has violated section
10(b) by breaking into the offices of a corporation, discovering
evidence of flagging sales, and selling the company’s stock short. If
an ex-director of a company tips off an acquaintance that the
Department of Justice is investigating the company for falsifying its
balance sheet in a 10K filing, the tippee may trade the stock even if
the investigation is undisclosed to the public. One must wonder how
this can be so.
Many people feel that the “system” is rigged. This sense of futility
rages in the public mind over income inequality, Washington politics,
and Wall Street financial shenanigans. Unprecedented dissatisfaction
with the 2016 presidential candidates, underlines the public’s
frustration, malaise, and anger.259 This Article does not presume to

section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession of material
information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has
reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has
been acquired directly or indirectly [from the offering person, the issuer, or
anyone acting on their behalf].
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2015); see also Council Directive 2003/6, arts. 1–4, 2003 O.J.
(L 96) 20–21 (EC) (broadly banning trading on inside information in the European
Union without limiting liability to breaches of confidentiality or the tipper’s
acquisition of benefits).
258. See Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928,
935 (2014) (referring to the development of insider trading law as a “common-lawlike elaboration”).
259. See Brian Naylor, This Election, Anger and Frustration Aren’t Just on the Right,
NPR (Jan. 22, 2016, 4:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/22/464013725/thiselection-anger-and-frustration-isnt-just-on-the-right (discussing the widespread
dissatisfaction among the electorate); Clinton Holds Lead amid Record High Dislike of
Both Nominees, MONMOUTH U. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-
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suggest how to quell public discontent. But the Article does offer a
replacement for tortuous insider trading law. We need a law that will
restore public confidence in at least one facet of the largely
discredited financial markets. Let’s give the public something to
celebrate.

institute/reports/MonmouthPoll_US_082916/ (reporting a poll showing that thirtyfive percent of respondents did not have a favorable view of either major presidential
candidate).

